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spontaneous ascription is consistent with disagreement on the deep
intuition on which that ascription is based, and with disagreement
on other ascriptions of moral permissibility in other cases.
The present situation is analogous. Lowe and I agree in rejecting
the spontaneous ascription of intentionality in the case at issue
(understood on Lowe's terms). I reject it whilst retaining what I
take to be our deep intuition concerning intentionality, namely
that doing something is intentional if it is done because of an in-
tention on the agent's part to do it. It is just that in this unusual
case, the conditions in which the intuition is normally applied do
not obtain, so that the spontaneous ascription based on this
intuition is not here justified. Lowe rejects the spontaneous
ascription, but also the deep intuition. He holds an account of
intentionality which makes no reference to the agent's intentions.3
This account leads him to disagree with ascriptions of intentionality
based on the deep intuition; for example, even with a general
intention to kill Smith, Brown's killing is not intentional, but
rather 'neither intentional nor unintentional'.4 This is not the place
to discuss Lowe's general analysis of intentionality. It is enough to
have shown that our spontaneous ascriptions of intentionality in
Butler's problem can coherently be justified. Even where these
ascriptions are not tenable, no doubt is cast on the soundness of
that deep intuition, whose reflective application itself justifies their
revision.
Sunderland Polytechnic, Chester Road, © KIM DAVIES 1982
Sunderland SRI 3SD
3 See E. J. Lowe, 'An Analysis of Intentionality', The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 31,
October 1981.
4 Since writing this, Jonathan Lowe has told me of his uncertainty as to the applica-
tion of his analysis to cases which involve these general intentions.
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Here 'g' is to stand for 'God exists' and 'God' is to be defined as
'a most perfect being'.
Part II of Kordig's argument is a form of the ontological argu-
ment similar to that presented by Hartshorne [3] and Plantinga
[5], [6]. But part I attempts to supply what many have thought has
been crucially missing from ontological arguments — a supplemen-
tary argument for the possibility of God's existence. (See for
example [1], [2], [8] and [9].) Kordig attempts to argue for the
possibility of God's existence, moreover, on deontic grounds alone.
Kordig's deontic argument, however, suffers from the same
general defect as its ontological predecessors: it fails to get off the
ground.
Consider the first premise: 'Og', or 'It ought to be the case that
God exists'. Kordig maintains that even atheists 'should grant that
a perfect being ought to exist' (p. 207). But why? Surely one
simple atheistic strategy would be to insist that it is not possible
that God exists —just as the atheist has presumably maintained in
the face of simpler ontological arguments — and to deny 'Og' on
the grounds that it is not the case that the impossible ought to
exist. One man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens.
Let us put aside this standard objection, however, in order to
concentrate on some major difficulties in the supplementary
argument Kordig offers for his first premise:
Define God as a most perfect being. What is most perfect is, in particular,
deontically perfect.... What is deontically perfect, ought to exist. Thus,
God ought to exist. ([4]: p. 207).
How, in particular, are we to read the third sentence of this
argument: 'What is deontically perfect, ought to exist'?
One plausible reading is this: that whatever is specified (or at
least consistently specified) as deontically perfect ought to exist.
But this would be an unacceptable principle. It would, to begin
with, commit us to saying that each of a bizarre range of beings
ought to exist: deontically perfect and polka dot beings, deontically
perfect beings avidly devoted to stamp collecting, and so on. Such
a principle would also lead to contradiction. For consider two
purported beings, A and B. A is specified as the only deontically
perfect being, as necessarily existent, and as blue. B is specified as
the only deontically perfect being, as necessarily existent, and as
non-blue. On the principle at issue, each of these ought to exist,
since each is specified as deontically perfect. Since Op 5 Op for any
p, the existence of each is possible. But neither is contingent, so
both must exist. Given our full specifications for A and B, however,
both cannot exist.
If this is the reading intended in Kordig's argument for his first
premise, then, that argument offers no reason for the atheist to
embrace 'Og'. On this reading that argument relies on a principle
which leads to contradiction, and so deserves to be rejected by
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We might also offer a simpler reading for this crucial step in
Kordig's argument for his first premise, however, which does not
lead to contradiction: that it ought to be the case that a deontically
perfect being exists, in the simple sense that there ought to be such
a being.
There is a truth of deontic logic which is close to this, and which
even the atheist cannot deny: that a deontically perfect situation or
a deontically perfect world ought to exist. (There are serious
difficulties with this notion, however: see [7].) Perhaps it can also
be shown that a deontically perfect world must contain a deonti-
cally perfect being, and the atheist thus be forced to concede that
there ought to be a deontically perfect being.
Would this be enough for Kordig's argument? No. That the argu-
ment requires more than merely deontic perfection is clear from the
second step of the second part of the argument: Og D Dg. Here
Kordig says:
A most perfect being, however, is not contingent: ~(Og&:O~g). For
necessary existence is more perfect than contingent existence. Therefore,
if it is logically possible that God exists, it is logically necessary that God
exists: Og D Dg. ([4]: p. 208)
The logic of the argument does not strictly demand that the being
at issue be defined as 'most perfect', however. What is required is
that He be deontically perfect — so as to lend plausibility to the
first premise — and necessary, for the sake of 'Og D ng\
These two requirements, however — of deontic perfection and of
alethic necessity of existence — appear to be logically distinct. Once
the being at issue is specified not only as deontically perfect, then,
but as necessary as well, the first premise becomes less than
compelling and Kordig's argument for it becomes sadly incomplete.
The atheist, we will suppose, must concede that there ought to
be a deontically perfect being. Must he also concede that there
ought to be a deontically perfect and necessary being? Kordig offers
no reason to think so, and the answer would appear to be 'no'. The
atheist is no more forced to say that there ought to be a deontically
perfect and necessary being, it appears, than he is forced to say that
there ought to be a deontically perfect and polka-dot being, or a
deontically perfect being who is also an avid stamp collector.
Deontic perfection, after all, is perfection in terms of what is
permissible and obligatory, and moral perfection is its prime
exemplar. Existence in many possible worlds, or in all, does not
itself seem to be anything like a moral virtue, and it does not appear
that any being must fall short of moral perfection or anything like
it — must fail to fulfil any duties, for instance, or must violate any
rights or commit any wrongs — merely because that being is
contingent.
The atheist's commitment to the claim that it ought to be the
case that a deontically perfect being exists, then, does not appear to
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perfect and necessary being exists, and thus does not appear to
force him to accept 'Og' in any sense full enough for the purposes
of Kordig's argument as a whole.
On one interpretation of Kordig's argument for his first premise,
that argument relies on a principle which leads to contradiction. On
an alternative interpretation which avoids contradiction, the argu-
ment is sadly incomplete. I see no plausible reading of the argument,
and no plausible argument to the same purpose, which avoids both
of these flaws.
Kordig maintains that even atheists 'should grant a most perfect
being ought to exist' (p. 207). Whatever its edificatory value, it does
not appear that this 'should' has any important logical force. The
atheist seems no more compelled to grant 'Og' than 'Og', and thus
Kordig's deontic argument seems to offer no appreciable advance
over its ontological predecessors.
State University of New York, ©PATRICK GRIM 1982
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ON BEING A CAT
By E.J. LOWE
IN 'The paradox of the 1,001 cats' (ANALYSIS 42.1, January 1982),I argued that a lump of feline tissue c could not be a cat, on the
grounds that the sortal terms 'lump of feline tissue' and 'cat' have
different criteria of identity associated with them. To this Professor
P. T. Geach replied, in effect, that something may be a cat without
necessarily complying with the criterion of identity associated with
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